Bond refunding in postbellum New Orleans: The premium bond plan by Razek, Joseph R. & Odaiyappa, Ramasamy
The Accounting Historians Notebook
Volume 13
Number 2 Fall 1990 Article 8
1990




Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_notebook
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in
The Accounting Historians Notebook by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information, please contact memanuel@olemiss.edu.
Recommended Citation
Razek, Joseph R. and Odaiyappa, Ramasamy (1990) "Bond refunding in postbellum New Orleans: The premium bond plan," The
Accounting Historians Notebook: Vol. 13 : No. 2 , Article 8.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_notebook/vol13/iss2/8
BOND REFUNDING IN POSTBELLUM 
NEW ORLEANS: THE PREMIUM BOND PLAN 
by 
Joseph R. Razek 
University of New Orleans 
Ramasamy Odaiyappa 
University of New Orleans 
When the Civil War broke out, New 
Orleans was the leading city in the South. 
By 1875, New Orleans definitely was not. 
Like so many other Southern cities, it had 
fallen victim to the ravages of war and 
changes in patterns of trade —in this case 
due to the construction of a national 
railroad system and the subsequent 
decline in traffic along the Mississippi 
River. The assessed value of real and per-
sonal property in the City (its tax base) 
amounted to $125,192,403 in 1861 (City 
of New Orleans, 1865, p. 18). By 1864, 
this amount had fallen to $98,788,325 
(Ibid, p. 19), a loss of 21% in four years 
of wartime inflation. Eleven years later, 
it had only risen to $119,288,504 
(Phillips, p. 24). 
While part of the above decrease was 
due to the reduced valuation of real estate, 
the major portion was due to losses of per-
sonal property. For example, when the 
slaves were declared free, property assessed 
at $6,609,210 was removed from the 
City's tax rolls at one stroke (Ibid, p. 18). 
These numbers do not fully reflect the 
magnitude of the decline. From the 
following statement made in 1868 by then 
mayor of New Orleans, Edward Heath, it 
can be inferred that the dollars shown in 
the city's records are not federal dollars, 
but a form of local currency—which must 
have depreciated significantly during and 
after the Civil War. According to Mayor 
Heath, 
"The City currency is a subject 
which has painfully occupied 
a good deal of our attention 
of late. It is a paper currency 
which represents not precious 
metals, but rests solely on the 
credit of the city. The present 
city government is not respon-
sible for its introduction. We 
found it in circulation when 
we came into office. It was the 
offspring of the war. It 
originated with the Council of 
1861. It had its precedent — 
not a venerable one, though 
rather time-worn, in the 
shinplasters of 1836-37 —a 
convenient kind of money, 
but which soon flooded the 
community in such quantity 
that the Legislature was com-
pelled to intervene and pro-
hibit the overissue of it." 
(Report to the Common 
Council of New Orleans, 
1868) 
Regretably, the expenses of running the 
city did not decrease, and by 1875, the 
bonded indebtedness of New Orleans had 
reached $22,041,379 (Phillips, p. 24). The 
rate of taxation, which had been 15 mills 
in 1861, was 30 mills (Ibid, p. 4), and it 
was felt that in order to run the city and 
service this debt, a tax rate of 50 mills 
would be necessary (La. Laws, 1876, Act 
31, Preamble) — in a city whose economy 
had never really recovered from the 
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devastation of the Civil War or the ex-
cesses of the Reconstruction. 
This state of affairs did not pass un-
noticed by the financial community. 
While the bonds issued at this time by 
governmental units in the Northern part 
of the United States typically paid interest 
at the rate of 5% (New York Times, 
1876), those issued by the City of New 
Orleans paid interest at rates ranging from 
7 to 10% (Hecht, p. 5). To save the City 
from bankruptcy, drastic measures were 
necessary. 
THE PREMIUM BOND PLAN 
The plan put forth by the City's Ad-
ministrator of Finance, Mr. D.H. Adler, 
was known as the "Premium Bond Plan" 
and was designed to liquidate the City's 
bonded indebtedness over a 50-year 
period. Under this plan, which was 
adopted by the City Council on May 25, 
1875 (New Orleans City Ordinance 3130) 
and ratified by the Louisiana Legislature 
on March 6, 1876 (La. Laws 1876, Act 31), 
existing bonds, whose coupon rates 
averaged 7½% (Phillips, p. 5), would be 
converted into 5% Premium Bonds — 
redeemable from one to fifty years in the 
future. One million bonds, of $20 
denomination, would be issued in 10,000 
series of 1.00 bonds each. 
To determine which bonds were to be 
redeemed, numbers representing each 
series of outstanding bonds were placed 
in a wheel. Four times a year, on January 
31st, April 15th, July 31st and October 
15th, fifty numbers, representing 50 series 
of bonds, were drawn from this wheel by 
a blindfolded orphan boy. Twice a year, 
on January 15th and July 15th, holders of 
bonds of the series drawn participated in 
a premium distribution (another drawing) 
at which 1,176 premiums, ranging from 
$20 to $5,000 (and totaling $50,000), 
were distributed. All bonds which did not 
win any premium were paid at their par 
value, plus simple interest at the rate of 
5% from July 15th, 1875. 
To service the bonds and finance the 
premiums, the City Council was author-
ized by the Legislature to levy a tax of one 
and one-half percent (15 mills) on all 
assessed property within the corporate 
limits of the City. The proceeds of this tax 
were to be placed into a special fund 
"to be used for no other pur-
pose than the payment of said 
bonds and interest on the said 
premiums comprised in said 
allotments, and the funds so 
raised shall be placed to the 
credit of an account to be 
called the premium bond ac-
count, and no money from 
said fund shall be paid out ex-
cept of the joint authority of 
the commissioners of the con-
solidated debt. The said tax 
shall be denominated the 
premium bond tax, and shall 
be separately mentioned in 
the tax rolls and receipts." (La 
Laws, 1876, Act 31, Sec. 6.) 
The Premium Bond Plan was a mixed 
success. As is the case today, New Or-
leaneans love a game of chance. Here was 
a way to enter an honest lottery (the Loui-
siana lottery at this time definitely wasn't) 
and to perform a civic duty without los-
ing one's investment. Many bondholders 
jumped at this opportunity and ex-
changed their old bonds, at par, for this 
new form of security. 
Other bondholders, however, did not 
wish (or could not afford) to exchange 
securities with a high yield, which gave 
them income semiannually, for lower-
yielding ones —on which interest would 
not be paid until redemption, which 
could be as long as 50 years in the future. 
The end result was that premium bonds 
with a face value of about $13.5 million 
continued on page 26 
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were issued, while almost $10 million of 
the old high-interest bonds remained 
outstanding (Phillips, p. 6). 
The price of the premium bonds varied 
over the years. Although they were 
originally issued at par, their value fell to 
25 cents on the dollar (or $5 for a $20 
bond) when the constitutionality of the 
Premium Bond Act was questioned 
(Hecht, p. 9). After the Lousiana Supreme 
Court upheld the legality of the act by a 
3 to 2 decision (Docket #7907, 32 LA. 
Ann 726), the price of the bonds increased 
rapidly. 
While the Premium Bond Plan was be-
ing challenged, the City took advantage 
of the depressed prices of these bonds and, 
using monies received from the sale of cer-
tain street railway franchises, purchased 
over 3.5 million dollars of them on the 
open market—at a price averaging one-
third of their par value (Hecht, p. 9). 
Since these bonds continued to participate 
in the premium drawings, the City occa-
sionally won some of its own prizes. 
Over the next five decades, the 
premium bonds were gradually retired. 
Although most of the other debts of the 
city were consolidated and refinanced with 
lower-interest securities (the "Constitu-
tional 4's" of 1892), the premium bonds 
remained outstanding. In 1925, the last 
series of this bond issue was retired, and 
a unique form of financing was relegated 
to the annals of history. 
CONCLUSION 
New Orleans is still facing a financial 
crisis —this time because of the collapse of 
oil prices. Its bonds are barely investment 
grade, and its citizens are unwilling 
and/or unable to pay more property, in-
come or sales taxes. The local desire to 
engage in games of chance, however, is as 
strong as ever. Bingo games and off-track 
betting thrive, and casinos and a lottery 
26 
have been major political issues for the 
past several years. 
Why not revive the Premium Bond 
Plan? Here is a way to raise money for 
various worthy causes (e.g., teachers' 
salaries and a new prison) and to provide 
a constructive outlet for more affluent 
citizens' gambling instincts. Since the only 
"loss" to the bondholders would be a 
lower rate of interest, the usual arguments 
against lotteries would not apply (poor 
people don't ordinarily buy bonds). In to-
day's environment, such a plan would be 
bound to succeed. 
REFERENCES: 
City of New Orleans, Controllers Report 
Embracing a Detailed Statement of the 
Revenues and Expenditures of the City 
of New Orleans from January 1st, 1864 
to December 31st, 1864 (New Orleans: 
Price Current Office, 1865). 
Docket #7907, Lucas E. Moore vs City of 
New Orleans et al and State ex rel. 
Lucas E. Moore vs City of New Orleans 
et al. New Orleans, May, 1880 (32 La. 
Ann. 726). 
Heath, E., Report to the Common 
Council of New Orleans (New Orleans: 
City of New Orleans, May 5, 1868). 
Hecht, R.S., Municipal Finances of New 
Orleans, 1860-1916 (New Orleans, 
Commission Council, 1916). 
Louisiana Legislature, Louisiana Laws, 
1876, Act 31 (New Orleans: Louisiana 
Legislature, 1876). 
New York Times (various issues), 1876. 
Phillips, Horace P., History of the 
Bonded Debt of the City of New 
Orleans, 1822-1933 (New Orleans, 
Horace P. Phillips, 1934). 
Accounting Historians Notebook, Fall, 1990 3
Razek and Odaiyappa: Bond refunding in postbellum New Orleans: The premium bond plan
Published by eGrove, 1990
